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 Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie or kritische Gesellschaftspraxis? 
 
Robin Celikates, Kritik als soziale Praxis. 
Gesellschaftliche Selbstverständigung und kritische Theorie 
(Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2009) 
 
Simon Susen 
 
Robin Celikates’s recent book, entitled Kritik als soziale Praxis. 
Gesellschaftliche Selbstverständigung und kritische Theorie (Criticism 
as Social Practice: Social Self-Understanding and Critical Theory), 
published  by Campus Verlag in 2009, is undoubtedly one of  the most 
significant contributions made to the field of critical theory  over the past 
few years. If there is one major problem with this volume,  it is the fact 
that it has still not  been  translated  into, let alone  published in, English. 
Given the conceptual precision, methodological rigour, intellectual 
originality, and thought-provoking argument of this study, one can 
only hope the volume will soon be available in English, so that its 
timely relevance and scholarly quality can be appreciated by a wider 
international readership in general and by Anglophone researchers 
working in the humanities and social sciences in particular. It is not 
often that one reads a book from cover to cover and has the pleasant 
experience of noticing that every single paragraph, and indeed every 
single sentence, is carefully crafted, meticulously organized, and thor- 
oughly researched. One must congratulate the author for putting 
together a long-needed treasure of a book which makes a convincing 
case for the view that the very possibility of critical theory depends on its 
capacity to ground itself in the normative potentials and everyday 
disputes of society, rather than in the abstract concepts and sterile 
epistemic frameworks of armchair philosophy. In order to illustrate the 
complexity of Celikates’s ambitious endeavour, this review article shall 
provide a succinct overview of the main arguments and contributions, as 
well as of several noteworthy shortcomings and limitations, of Kritik als 
soziale Praxis. 
 
 
Argument  and structure 
 
 
The book is divided into three main parts. As Axel Honneth, who 
supervised the PhD thesis upon which this volume is based, eloquently 
 
 remarks in the Foreword, the line of reasoning underlying the study 
follows a ‘‘dialectical scheme of argumentation’’ (p. 10): thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis. Part I, the ‘‘thesis’’, focuses on the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu, who is eager to insist that, if we accept that there is an 
ineluctable epistemological gap between the objectifying gaze of re- 
flexive researchers and the short-sighted perspective of ordinary actors, 
we have every reason to assume that the critical capacity to uncover the 
underlying mechanisms that govern the development of human reality 
remains a privilege of those engaged in scientific activity. In addition to 
examining the contributions of ethnomethodology to the sociological 
analysis of human reflexivity, Part II, the ‘‘antithesis’’, centres on the 
work of Luc Boltanski, who, along with Loïc Wacquant, is now widely 
regarded as one of Bourdieu’s most distinguished disciples. According  to 
Boltanski’s ‘‘methodological egalitarianism’’ (p. 12), critical capacity 
constitutes  a  vital  human  competence.  In  fact,  ordinary  forms  of 
interaction and discursive modes of reflection do not exclude but 
complement one another in everyday life. In Part III, the ‘‘synthesis’’, 
Celikates reflects on the possibility of transcending the 
counterproductive antinomy between Bourdieu’s ‘‘critical sociology’’ and 
Boltanski’s ‘‘sociology of critique’’ by overcoming the main flaws of 
these two approaches, whilst drawing on the compelling insights that 
can be gained from each of them. Essentially, Celikates seeks to 
demonstrate that a genuinely emancipatory critical theory not only 
needs to make use of the conceptual and methodological tools 
designed by social scientists ‘‘from above’’, but also has to study, and 
attribute substantial importance to, the reflexive and discursive 
processes generated by ordinary actors ‘‘from below’’. In short, we 
need to take both social scientists and ordinary actors seriously, if we 
aim to shed light on the pivotal role that criticism plays both in the 
systematic objectification and in the day-to-day functioning of society. 
In a skilfully argued and intellectually challenging Introduction, 
Celikates sets the scene by making a strong case for the view that 
criticism can be conceived of as a constitutive social practice, that is, as 
an activity that is crucial not only to undertaking scientific research but 
also to shaping the normative parameters underlying the material and 
symbolic arrangements put in place to organize people’s actions and 
reflections in a given society. When trying to make sense of the 
relationship between scientific and  ordinary  knowledge,  we  are,  as  the  
author   points   out,   confronted   with   three   epistemological  options. 
(1) There is ‘‘the  orthodox conception of critical social science’’ (p.  25), 
according  to   which   we  need  to  face  up  to  the  profound ‘‘epistemic 
 
 
 asymmetry’’ (p. 25, italics added) between reflexive scientists and ordinary 
actors. Following this model, the primary task of social science consists in 
the ‘‘explanation of social phenomena’’ (p. 26), that is, in uncovering the 
underlying mechanisms that largely determine the constitution and evolution 
of the social world. (2) The epistemological model epitomized in 
‘‘ethnomethodology  and  the  sociology  of  critique’’ (p. 26), as well as in the 
‘‘pragmatic  turn’’ (p.  26), suggests  that, contrary  to the orthodox conception 
of social science, we need to recognize ‘‘the fundamental symmetry between 
‘laypeople’ and  ‘experts’’’  (p.  26).  From this perspective, the primary task of 
social science lies in the ‘‘description and interpretation of social phenomena’’ 
(p. 26) on the basis of the careful examination of the material and symbolic 
practices carried out by ordinary actors, who need to be taken seriously as 
reflexive subjects capable of shaping, and attributing meaning to, their existence. 
(3) According to Celikates’s own approach, which he characterizes as ‘‘criticism 
as social practice’’ (p. 26), it is essential to acknowledge that, whilst ordinary 
actors are endowed with ‘‘capacities of articulation and reflection’’ (p. 26), it 
must remain the task of critical researchers to engage in the ‘‘analysis  and  
critique of the social conditions that obstruct the development of reflexive 
capacities and of their realization in corresponding practices’’ (p. 26). In short, 
Celikates’s project is based on the assumption that valuable insights  can be 
gained from cross-fertilizing the critical practices of ordinary actors and the 
reflexive  tools of social  scientists. 
Before embarking upon the laborious task of analysing the pre- 
suppositional foundations of each of the above models, Celikates provides 
the reader with a useful overview of  four central  ‘‘dogmas’’  (p. 27), upon 
which, he  claims,  ‘‘the  classical  model  of  ideology critique’’ (p. 27) is 
based. (i) According to the dogma of ‘‘scientism and objectivism’’ (p. 27), the 
‘‘objective’’ (p. 27) nature of the ‘‘scientific method’’ (p. 27) and of the 
knowledge gained from it is indicative of the ‘‘non-normative’’ (p. 27) 
character of critical social research. (ii) According to the dogma of ‘‘totality’’ 
(p. 27), social reality, which is composed of both  practices  and  institutions,   
constitutes   a   ‘‘homogenous   totality’’ (p. 27). (iii) According to the dogma 
of ‘‘functionalism’’ (p.  27), society  can be conceived of as an ensemble of 
‘‘factually enclosed and seamlessly integrated systems’’ (p. 27), whose causal 
functioning cannot properly be grasped by those whose everyday practices 
allow for the very possibility of the emergence of a relationally constructed 
reality. (iv) According to the dogma of ‘‘asymmetry and rupture’’ (p. 27), ‘‘the 
critical impetus of scientifically founded theory’’ (p. 27) obliges reflexive 
researchers to undertake  an  epistemological  break  with  ‘‘the  perspective  of  
 
 
 
 
 
 ‘ordinary’ actors and common sense’’ (p. 27), implying that there is an 
epistemic gap between the ‘‘internal perspective’’ (p. 27) of the social 
participant and the ‘‘external  perspective’’  (p.  27)  of the scientific observer. 
Challenging the validity of these four assumptions, Celikates raises the 
following objections: (i) Contrary to  the  dogma  of  scientism and 
objectivism, we need to account for the profoundly ‘‘normative 
structure’’  (p.  28,  italics  added)  not  only  of  human  practices  in 
everyday life but also of empirical and theoretical studies in social 
research. (ii) Contrary to the dogma of totality, we need to confront the 
sociological challenge of exploring the intrinsic ‘‘plurality and hetero- 
geneity’’ (p. 28, italics added) of polycentric societies, in which most 
actors  are  exposed  to  high  degrees  of  interactional  complexity. 
Contrary to the dogma of macro-systemic functionalism, we need to 
embrace ‘‘an attenuated, local functionalism’’ (p. 28 italics added), 
which, rather than seeking to present the ‘‘big picture’’ of the macrostructural 
processes that allow for the reproduction of social order, focuses on examining 
‘‘the stabilization of particular institutions, practices, and interpretive schemes’’ 
(p. 28). (iv) Contrary to the dogma of asymmetry and rupture, we need to 
concede that critical capacity is not  a  socio-professional   privilege   of   
reflexive   researchers   but   a socio-ontological competence of ordinary actors. 
In brief, Celikates  invites  us  to  reflect  upon the ways in which everyday 
experiences of actors situated  in polycentric societies are shaped by the 
preponderance of normativity, complexity, locality, and discursivity. With  these  
considerations  in  mind, the remainder of the book is dedicated to 
demonstrating that important insights can be gained from initiating a fruitful  
dialogue  between  Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism (‘‘thesis’’) and Boltanski’s 
sociological pragmatism (‘‘antithesis’’), leading Celikates to propose an 
alternative  model based on the reflexive exercise of ‘‘reconstructive critique’’ 
(‘‘synthesis’’). 
 
 
Bourdieu’s model of rupture: ‘‘I can see something you cannot see’’, or: 
‘‘I spy with my little eye’’ 
 
To cut a long story short, Bourdieu’s critical sociology is unambig- 
uously Durkheimian in assuming that ‘‘[human] actors are involved in 
practice in a way that makes reflexive and critical perspective-taking 
impossible and  forces  them  to establish a structurally pre-reflexive and 
naïve relation to the conditions underlying their actions’’ (p. 39). 
Considering   Auguste Comte’s  belief in  the enlightening scientificity of 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
sociological knowledge, Durkheim’s insistence upon the sociologist’s 
duty to be categorically distrustful of the illusory preconceptions of 
common sense, and Marx’s dictum that there would be no point in 
producing scientific knowledge if the outward appearance and the 
essence of things directly coincided, we may follow Celikates in facing 
up to the fact that ‘‘the dogma of rupture is as old as sociology itself’’ 
(p. 40). 
If there is one thing that Bourdieu adds to the normative centrality 
of the notion of rupture in critical social research, it is the idea that 
reflexive sociologists should aim to undertake a ‘‘double’’, rather than 
a ‘‘single’’, epistemological break (p. 56) by overcoming the pitfalls of both 
the doxic preconceptions derived from common sense and the scholastic 
fallacies in which intellectualist thinkers remain trapped when treating 
the ‘‘things of logic’’ as the ‘‘logic of things’’. In other words, reflexive 
scientists need to free themselves from both the preconceptions of those 
who are ‘‘too involved’’ in social life to grasp the underlying mechanisms 
by which their lives are determined and the theoreticist frameworks of 
those who are ‘‘too removed’’ from social life to realize that their 
intellectualist thought experiments are largely detached from the con- 
straints of everyday life and lack empirical substantiation. 
As pointed out by Celikates, ‘‘Bourdieu’s conception of critical 
social science is based on two steps’’ (p. 72): first, the action-theoretic 
assumption that there is an inherent ‘‘nexus between structure, 
habitus, and practice’’ (p. 72), that is, a homological correspondence 
between the relationally defined positions that actors occupy in social 
fields and the naturalized dispositions that they develop by virtue of 
their habitus (p. 73); and, second, the ‘‘methodological plea for a radical 
rupture with the perspective of actors’ self-understanding’’ (p. 72), that 
is, with their inability to grasp the complexities of social reality, 
because, as ordinary people, they remain caught up in ideologically 
powerful misconceptions and relatively arbitrary misrepresentations. 
Hence,   borrowing   an   expression   from   the   French  philosopher 
Paul Ricœur,  Bourdieu’s critical sociology is founded  on the idea of      
a ‘‘hermeneutics of suspicion’’ (p. 73). Why, then, does Celikates think 
that we need to be critical of Bourdieu’s plea for a ‘‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’’? The author elaborates on four serious objections that  can  
be raised against Bourdieu’s model of the epistemological break. 
 
(1) Celikates raises the normative objection that, contrary to 
Bourdieu’s objectivist position, we cannot ignore the fact that 
in sociology ‘‘the object of scientific study is at the same time 
 a subject’’ (p. 76, italics added): given that the human world is 
a cultural realm of interpretive entities, who attach meaning to 
their natural and social environment, we need to account for 
the normativity that permeates all value-laden aspects of 
human reality. If we draw an ontological distinction between 
the natural and the social world, since they constitute two 
fundamentally different forms of being composed of qualita- 
tively distinct entities, we also have to draw a methodological 
distinction between the natural and the social sciences, for the 
epistemic tools and research strategies of the former are 
insufficient to grasp the specificity of human life, which cannot 
be  disregarded by the latter. 
(2) Celikates  raises  the  politico-strategic  objection  that, behind 
Bourdieu’s orthodox conception of social science, which is 
arguably based on a ‘‘phenomenology of an avant-garde con- 
sciousness’’ (p. 78), lurks the danger of embracing a position of 
‘‘epistemic and ethical authoritarianism’’ (p. 78). Such a pater- 
nalist view overestimates the cognitive capacities and moral 
integrity of critical researchers and underestimates the critical 
and reflexive competences of ordinary actors, thereby reducing 
social emancipation to an exogenously monitored project im- 
posed upon largely heteronomous subjects. As a consequence,  
a tension arises between ‘‘a positivist perspective, according to 
which the social world is governed by rigid laws’’ (p. 79, italics 
added), whose determinacy can be uncovered only by scientific 
modes of reflexivity, and ‘‘a critical perspective, which presup- 
poses both the malleability of social relations and actors’ 
performative  capacity’’ (p.  79, italics added), without which it 
would be pointless to believe in the possibility of bringing about 
emancipatory forms of sociality. 
(3) Celikates raises the methodological objection that Bourdieu fails 
to take the implications of ‘‘interpretive and pragmatic (and, 
thus, post-empiricist)’’ (p. 81, italics added) approaches in the 
social sciences seriously:  if, as mentioned above, the object of 
social-scientific study constitutes a subject capable of producing 
both individually uttered and collectively mediated forms of 
meaning, then the particularity of the social world needs to be 
reflected in ‘‘the idiosyncrasy of the social sciences on the 
ontological, methodological, and epistemological level’’ (p. 81), 
that is, in terms of what the social world is, how it can be 
studied, and how and to what extent it can be understood both  
 
 
 by its participants and by its observers. This task is 
expressed in the proposal of a ‘‘double hermeneutics’’ (p. 
81), which aims to do  justice  to the fact  that  the  
symbolic  constitution of the social world can be adequately 
grasped only insofar as we explore people’s everyday forms 
of understanding, through which they attribute meaning to 
their existence. 
(4) Celikates raises the empirical objection that ‘‘the central 
theses of the orthodox model of critical social science’’ (p. 
89), as defended by Bourdieu, remain trapped in the 
monolithic logic of the ‘‘dominant ideology thesis’’ (p. 
90)
1
. According to this logic, hegemonic sets of ideas 
are macro-structurally constituted forms of ‘‘social 
cement’’ (p. 89), whose main function consists in 
guaranteeing both the reproduction of social order and the 
legitimation of social domination. Such a functionalist 
view, however, tends to underestimate the extent to which 
most people living in complex societies are not only 
allowed but are in fact expected to take on a multiplicity of 
roles, and therefore develop a plurality of perspectives when 
dealing with the various praxeological imperatives thrown at 
them in different interactional contexts. Confronted with 
‘‘unstable behavioural expectations and increasing risks of 
dissension’’ (p. 92), arising  from their potential exposure 
to and bodily immersion in gradually more differentiated 
realms of social interaction, ‘‘plural actors’’ (p. 90) are 
profoundly challenged by the socio-ontological dialectics 
between ‘‘engagement and distanciation’’ (p. 92), role-
playing and perspective-taking, intuitive participation and 
discursive reflection. Given the potential complexity 
underlying structurally differentiated realities, actors need 
to mobilize  the normative resources inherent in their critical 
capacity and rise to the task of surviving in the normative 
jungle of polycentric – or, as one may argue, centreless – 
societies. 
 
Boltanski’s  model  of symmetry:  « Suivre les acteurs » 
 
How can we take the aforementioned objections seriously? Celikates 
proposes to search for a response in the writings of one of Bourdieu’s 
most influential disciples: Luc Boltanski. In the recent sociological 
literature, particularly in France and Germany, Boltanski’s oeuvre has 
 
1 
On Celikates’s critique of the orthodox Marxist definition of ideology as ‘‘necessarily false 
consciousness’’, see pp. 220-221. 
  
been widely recognized as a major contribution to contemporary social 
science. This contribution is based on the creation of a new paradigm: 
the research programme commonly known as the ‘‘sociology of 
critique’’ or, as Boltanski has described it in his most recent writings, 
the ‘‘pragmatic sociology of critique’’. What is striking, however, is 
that in the literature there is a profound gap, and little in the way of 
constructive dialogue, between Bourdieu’s ‘‘critical sociology’’ and 
Boltanski’s ‘‘sociology of critique’’. It is one of the major achievements 
of Celikates’s book to have contributed to initiating a fruitful dialogue 
between these two accounts. This is not to suggest that Celikates ignores 
the substantial presuppositional differences between the two ap- 
proaches; rather, this is to acknowledge that the author, whilst recogniz- 
ing the profound epistemic and normative gap between Bourdieusian 
and Boltanskian thought, is willing to take on the challenging task of 
cross-fertilizing some of their most significant insights. Yet, before doing 
so, we need to follow Celikates in posing the obvious question of what can 
be learned from Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology of critique. 
As meticulously illustrated by Celikates, the ‘‘methodological 
paradigm shift’’ (p. 139) from Bourdieu’s ‘‘critical sociology’’ to 
Boltanski’s  ‘‘sociology of critique’’  is, first and foremost, motivated by 
the following insight: we have to take ordinary people seriously in order 
to account for the fact that critical capacity is an indispensable normative 
resource by which human actors shape the development of society. In 
other words, rather than establishing an epistemological hierarchy 
between reflexive and enlightened scientists, on the one hand, and naïve 
and misguided actors, on the other, we need to acknowledge the fact that 
the analytical resources of objectifying researchers derive from the 
reflexive capacities of ordinary people. Hence, if critical theory is to be 
given any kind of normative foundation, it needs to be located in people’s 
discursive ability to engage in disputes and justify their actions. One may 
even go as far as Bruno Latour by suggesting that ‘‘it is essential to restore 
actors’ capacity to formulate their own theories about the constitution  of 
the social’’ (p. 139, italics added; quoting Latour). Inspired by this 
perspective, Celikates justifiably draws an analogy between Boltanski’s 
pragmatic sociology and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, for both 
approaches follow the methodological maxim that we need to ‘‘suivre 
les acteurs’’ (p. 139)2 (literally, ‘‘follow the actors’’): only if we take 
‘‘their actions, interpretations, and judgements’’ (p. 139) seriously, can 
we  shed  light  on the multifaceted ways in which the development of 
 
 
2  On Celikates’s detailed analysis of ethnomethodology, see esp. pp. 104-116. 
  
society is contingent upon people’s practical ability to mobilize the 
discursive potentials built into their reflexive capacity. 
It is another noteworthy achievement of this book that Celikates, 
referring to the work of Michael Lynch, provides a fine-grained 
definition of the term reflexivity. This term is often loosely used or 
effectively misused by social scientists, and too frequently is its 
meaning taken for granted. Celikates, by contrast, offers an instructive 
definitional  typology  that  permits  us  to  identify  seven  influential 
meanings of this term (pp. 116-122): (1) basal or mechanical reflexivity, 
which can be found in technological devices; (2) self-reflexivity, which 
represents a constitutive feature of self-conscious beings; (3) substantial 
forms of societal reflexivity, which is based on the self-regulation of social 
systems; (4) reflexivity as a methodical category, which is expressed in 
cognitive processes of self-critical contemplation; (5) methodological or 
meta-theoretical reflexivity, which manifests itself in social-scientific ways 
of problematizing taken-for-granted ideas and practices; (6) interpretive 
reflexivity, which is epitomized in the concept of ‘‘double hermeneutics’’, 
aimed at the ‘‘interpretation of interpretation’’; and (7) ethnomethodolog- 
ical reflexivity,  which  is  derived  from  critical  capacity,  conceived  of as 
a socio-ontological competence of ordinary actors. It should come as no 
surprise that, as elucidated by Celikates, it is the seventh category of this 
typology which is particularly important  to  Boltanski’s  insistence  upon 
the sociological centrality of ordinary processes of action and justification. 
In fact, it is one of the central premises of Boltanski’s pragmatic 
approach to consider ‘‘the experiences made and self-interpretations 
accomplished by ‘ordinary’ actors as the point of departure’’ (p. 138) of 
sociological analysis. In this sense, it presupposes that ‘‘the mutual 
recognition of their reflexive and critical capacities is a constitutive 
element of actors’ everyday practices and self-understanding’’ (p. 138). 
From this perspective, ordinary people can be regarded as ‘‘justifica- 
tory entities’’ (Rechtfertigungswesen), that is, as potentially critical 
subjects capable not only of justifying  their  everyday  practices  but  
also of reflexively distancing themselves from themselves and their 
actions. One of the main contributions of Boltanski’s sociology is to 
have provided abundant empirical data combined with useful concep- 
tual tools to illustrate that different ‘‘regimes of  action’’  require 
different ‘‘regimes of justification’’ (pp. 140-149) with varying degrees 
of  critical reflection. 
Bringing conceptual sharpness, explanatory precision, and consid- 
erable eloquence to bear, Celikates draws attention to the fact that 
Boltanski’s pragmatist approach to different regimes  of  justification, 
  
understood as disputed ‘‘realm[s] of reasons’’ (p. 146), is based on four 
principles: symmetry, pluralism, capacity, and grammars of agreement 
(pp. 148-149). According to the principle of symmetry, we need to 
reject ‘‘the strict separation and hierarchization of scientific and un- 
or non-scientific forms of action and cognition’’ (p. 148), thereby 
refusing to accept  the  positivist  parameters  underlying   Bourdieu’s   
model  of epistemological rupture. According to the principle of 
pluralism, we need to account for the fact that multiple regimes of 
action are sustained by diversified regimes of justification, thereby 
reminding  us of the fact that most actors in complex societies find 
themselves, often simultaneously, immersed in a ‘‘plurality of 
‘worlds’’’ (p. 148). According to the principle of reflexive capacities, 
we need to acknowledge that ordinary people are equipped with an 
intuitive ‘‘know-how’’ (p. 148), which enables them to commute back 
and forth ‘‘between the different ‘worlds’’’ (p. 148), thereby 
recognizing their practical ability ‘‘to combine universals (principles, 
rules, etc.) with particulars (concrete situations, persons, etc.)’’ (p. 
148) and ‘‘to distance themselves from particular contexts of action’’ 
(p. 148). According to the principle  of the grammars of agreement, we 
need to examine the ‘‘rules that actors have  to  follow  in  order  to  
coordinate  their  actions  and judgements’’ (p. 148), thereby 
demonstrating that ‘‘particular patterns of justification and narration’’ 
(p. 148) emanate from context-specific  grammars of action and 
coordination. 
Perhaps the most significant insight to be gained from the  
sociological study of these principles is  that  –  regardless of  whether 
we consider ‘‘reformist’’ or ‘‘radical’’, ‘‘immanent’’ or ‘‘transcendent’’, 
‘‘corrective’’ or ‘‘transformative’’ forms of critique (pp. 149-151) – 
‘‘[t]he quotidian practices of criticism and justification show a struc-  
tural affinity with the procedures of critical social theory’’ (p. 152). Put 
bluntly,  the épreuve  (p.  149)  is  in  the  pudding:  every  ‘‘principle  of 
justification’’  (p.  149)  needs  to  pass  the  test  of  being  defensible  as 
a grandeur (p. 149) which connects the performances of different  
acteurs. Yet, how does Celikates justify the grandeur of his own project? 
 
 
Celikates’s model of critical theory: the power of reconstructive critique 
 
In the third and final part of the book, Celikates develops an outline 
for an alternative model of critical theory, which is based on  the  
reflexive exercise of ‘‘reconstructive critique’’ (see esp. pp. 159-160 and 
187-247).  With  the  aim  of  illustrating  both  the  complexity  and  the 
 
 
 viability of such an alternative proposal, the author deals with a number of 
controversial issues such as the following: the relationship between ‘‘in- 
ternal’’ and ‘‘external’’ critique; the sociological significance of so-called 
‘‘second order pathologies’’; the explanatory and normative functions of 
critical theory; the distinction between ‘‘social critique’’, ‘‘meta-critique’’, 
and ‘‘reconstructive critique’’; the challenges posed by  psychoanalysis, 
social theories of knowledge, and system justification theories; and, most 
importantly, the emancipatory potentials of ‘‘reconstructive critique’’. The 
question  remains,   however,   what  Celikates  has  in  mind  when  
making   a case for an alternative model of critical theory based on the 
reflexive exercise  of  ‘‘reconstructive critique’’. 
To be clear from the outset, the starting point of Celikates’s 
alternative project is a negative one, namely the categorical 
rejection of ‘‘the false alternative of internal and external critique’’ 
(p. 187)
3
. The point, he contends, is to overcome the 
counterproductive antinomy between ‘‘an internal (or soft and 
contextualist) form of critique’’ (p. 161), which emerges in ‘‘the 
circle of community’’ (p. 161) and is formulated by ordinary actors 
preoccupied with understanding their existence by immersing 
themselves  in  discursive  practices,  and  ‘‘an  external (or  strong 
and  context-transcending) form of critique’’ (pp. 160-161), which 
‘‘draws on social-scientific methods’’ (p.  161) aimed at explaining 
‘‘functional laws of social and historical  processes’’ (p. 161), which 
can be uncovered by making use of sophisticated conceptual and 
methodological tools whose epistemic  complexity reaches far beyond 
the misleading simplicity of doxic preconceptions and everyday forms 
of ‘‘spontaneous sociology’’ (p. 96). 
Rather than subscribing to the antonymic distinction between 
internal  and  external  critique,  Celikates  proposes  to  introduce 
the concept of ‘‘reconstructive critique’’, which is based on a 
distinction between ‘‘first-order’’ and ‘‘second-order’’ constructions 
(p. 187). As he eloquently   puts   it,   ‘‘from   this   perspective,   
reconstruction   is   the attempt to make an implicit normative 
content explicit. It constitutes  a second-order construction in that it 
relies on ‘ordinary’ actors’ practices and self-understandings as 
well as on their reflexive first-order constructions [...]’’ (p. 187).   
In  other  words,  ‘‘reconstructive critique’’  is  the  systematic 
attempt     to     locate    the     normative     foundations    of   second- 
order   constructions   developed    by  social  scientists  in  the 
reflexive   expressions  of  first-order   constructions  articulated  by 
 
3 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between ‘‘internal’’ and ‘‘external’’ critique, see 
esp.  pp. 160-166. 
  
ordinary actors. According to this view, the epistemic quality of 
different forms of scientificity is derived from actors’ critical capacity, 
which permits them to shape the development of both their individ- 
uality and their society. 
Celikates suggests that critique, understood in the above way, has 
four key features (p. 188) : (a) it is constructive in the sense that it 
incorporates   the   first-order  knowledge  of  everyday   life   into the 
explicative and interpretive horizon of second-order knowledge of 
social science, rather than strictly separating the latter from the former; 
(b) it is normative in the sense that, by drawing on actors’ reflexive 
practices and taking them seriously, it refuses to take on the prosely- 
tizing mission of inventing universal parameters for the realization of 
the good life and its orchestration ‘‘from above’’, thereby regarding 
humans as creators of their own destiny; (c) it is dialogical in the sense 
that its own epistemic accomplishments do not bypass but engage with 
actors’ reflexive attempts to reach self-understanding; (d) it is critical 
in the sense that, in some cases, radical social change is inconceivable 
without ‘‘the transformation of actors’ understanding of themselves, 
that  is,   the  deconstruction  of  structurally  conditioned  barriers   to 
reflection’’ (p. 188). In short, what lies at the heart of Celikates’s project 
of ‘‘reconstructive critique’’ is the conviction that we must neither 
overestimate the enlightening power of social-scientific research nor 
underestimate the self-enlightening capacities of ordinary actors. 
Just as Bourdieu has a point when insisting on the epistemic value of 
the conceptual and methodological tools designed by social researchers 
with the aim of unmasking what is not immediately obvious to ordinary 
actors, Boltanski is right to insist that every subject capable of reflection 
and action is able to engage in disputes and processes of justification. 
Assuming that both scientific and ordinary actors are equipped with 
reflexive resources, which indicate that critical capacity constitutes an 
indispensable discursive force for both the study and the functioning of 
society, Celikates proposes to cross-fertilize the respective insights of first- 
order and second-order epistemic constructions, instead of artificially 
separating internal and external forms of critique from one another. 
 
 
Weaknesses and limitations 
 
 
Despite the overall strength and timely relevance of Celikates’s 
project, in particular his attempt to demonstrate that important lessons 
  
can be learned not only from combining Bourdieusian and Boltanskian 
thought but also from making a case for an alternative model based on 
the notion of ‘‘reconstructive critique’’, we need to reflect on some of  
the key weaknesses and limitations of Kritik als soziale Praxis. These 
shortcomings shall be briefly considered in this final section. 
The first, and most general, criticism one may make of Celikates’s 
study is that its underlying theme, the analysis of the relationship 
between scientific and ordinary forms of knowledge production, has 
been on the agenda for a long time. The centrality of this distinction 
has been thoroughly discussed in some of the most influential debates 
that have been taking place in the humanities and social sciences over the 
past one hundred and fifty years. We may consider the presuppositional 
differences between naturalist and anti-naturalist approaches in the 
context of the ‘‘methodological dispute’’ (Methodenstreit), the opposi- 
tion between the paradigm of explanation and the paradigm of 
interpretation in the humanities and social sciences, the divide between 
Durkheimian and Weberian schools of thought in sociology, or the 
rivalry between positivist and interpretivist traditions in social re- 
search; one key dimension that the controversies regarding the 
significance of these paradigmatic antinomies have in common is that 
they are unavoidably concerned with the epistemological implications 
arising from the distinction between scientific and ordinary forms of 
knowledge production. What Celikates regrettably fails to spell out, 
however, is to what extent the lessons that can be learned from 
comparing, contrasting, and combining Bourdieu’s ‘‘critical sociology’’ 
and Boltanski’s ‘‘sociology of critique’’ go beyond the insights gained 
from previous debates. Given this omission in Celikates’s study, the 
reader remains under the impression that we are dealing with old 
problems in new clothes, and that the differences between previous and 
contemporary controversies are merely semantic, rather than sub- 
stantive. In other words, it would have been useful if Celikates had 
explained to what extent new lessons can be learned from cross- 
fertilizing Bourdieu’s scientistic account of epistemological rupture 
and Boltanski’s pragmatic model of epistemological symmetry. 
Second, when Celikates takes issue with the ‘‘classical project of 
ideology critique’’ (p. 27) in  terms  of  four  underlying  ‘‘dogmas’’ 
(p. 27), he does not tell us who in the contemporary social sciences 
would seriously defend these sets of presuppositions in the way they 
are presented in his study. One may, of course, have good reason to 
attribute the dogmas of scientism/objectivism and rupture/asymmetry 
to  Bourdieu,  but  Celikates does not provide any evidence to support 
  
the view that the most influential French sociologist of the  late  
twentieth century conceives of reality, in accordance with the second 
dogma in question, as a ‘‘homogenous totality’’ (p. 27). This lack of 
analytical  evidence  is  not  surprising,  given  that  the  whole  point  of 
Bourdieu’s field theory is to account for the polycentric, rather than 
‘‘homogenous’’ or ‘‘monolithic’’, nature of differentiated societies. 
Even if, in response to this criticism, Celikates may be willing to 
concede that the idea of portraying society as a ‘‘homogenous totality’’ 
does not apply to Bourdieu, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
find a contemporary sociologist who would seriously seek to defend the 
validity of all four aforementioned dogmas. 
Third, although Celikates appears to admit that it would be 
reductive to accuse Bourdieu of unreservedly subscribing to the 
‘‘dogma of rupture and asymmetry’’ (see, for example, p. 79), he 
does not express the same caution when associating Boltanski’s work 
with the paradigm of ‘‘symmetry’’ (p. 26), that is, with the view that the 
relationship between ‘‘social-scientific experts and laypersons’’ (p. 28) is 
symmetrically structured. On a number of occasions, Boltanski distances 
himself from such an idealistic misinterpretation of his work, recognizing 
that, even if we take ordinary actors seriously, we must not forget that, in 
terms of both their epistemic capacities and their situatedness in the social 
space, it would be untenable to characterize the relationship between 
social scientists and laypersons as ‘‘symmetrical’’. Just as we need to 
account for the fact that Bourdieu, particularly in his later writings, is 
willing to incorporate an interpretive dimension to his analysis
4
, 
Boltanski, notably in response to the most common misreadings of his 
position, is prepared to accept that it would be naïve to assume that 
the critical researcher, who is capable of objectification, and the critical 
actor, who is capable of justification, stand on an equal footing
5
. 
Fourth, one issue that will strike readers who are familiar with the 
writings of both Bourdieu and Boltanski is that, in this book, Celikates 
has a tendency to read the work of the former too much through the 
 
 
4 
Celikates acknowledges this when stating (on p. 79) that the methodological approach 
defended in The Weight of the World may be seen as indicative of an ‘‘interpretive turn’’ in 
Bourdieu’s œuvre. On this point, see Pierre Bourdieu, ‘‘Comprendre’’, in Pierre Bourdieu (ed.) 
La misère du monde (Paris, Seuil, 1993), pp. 1389-1447. 
5  On this  issue, see, for example:  Luc Boltanski, Juliette Rennes, and Simon  Susen, ‘‘La 
fragilité  de  la réalité.  Entretien  avec  Luc  Boltanski.  Propos  recueillis  par  Juliette  Rennes  et 
Simon Susen’’, Mouvements 64, 2010, pp. 149-164, esp. pp. 155-156. See also Luc Boltanski, 
‘‘Critique sociale et sens moral. Pour une sociologie du jugement’’, in Tetsuji Yamamoto (ed.) 
Philosophical Designs for a Socio-Cultural Transformation: Beyond Violence and the Modern Era 
(Tokyo;  Boulder,  CO:  EHESS;  Rowman  &  Littlefield,  1998), pp.  248-273. 
  
eyes of the latter. This, of course, applies particularly to Celikates’s 
legitimate criticisms of the controversial aspects of Bourdieu’s work, 
notably the positivist, paternalist, functionalist, and determinist di- 
mensions of his œuvre. What is much more problematic about 
Celikates’s study, however, is the fact that his assessment of Bourdieu’s 
and Boltanski’s respective contributions suffers from a remarkable 
analytical imbalance. Part I contains a large section that is concerned 
with  the  weaknesses  and  pitfalls  of  Bourdieu’s  model  of  rupture 
(pp. 76-97), not to mention the various critical comments on the 
erroneous assumptions underlying Bourdieusian thought
6  
that can  be 
found throughout the entire volume. Part II, by contrast, does not 
offer  anything  in  the  way  of  a detailed criticism of Boltanski’s work7. 
One may speculate about the reasons for this omission, the  most  
obvious being the fact that Celikates’s own project of ‘‘reconstructive 
critique’’, as outlined in Part III, is arguably much closer to Boltanski’s 
‘‘sociology of critique’’ than to Bourdieu’s ‘‘critical sociology’’, even if 
the author aims to draw on the respective insights provided by each of 
these approaches. In a similar vein, it is worth mentioning that it would 
have been useful to apply the central theme of this study, criticism as social 
practice, not only to other scholars but also to the author’s alternative 
model by incorporating some self-critical reflections on the limitations of 
Celikates’s own project. The point is not to suggest that the author is 
expected to invalidate his own approach, but to demonstrate that, just as 
he is capable of raising forceful objections to Bourdieu’s work, he is 
prepared to elaborate, in an equally conscientious manner, on the pitfalls 
of Boltanski’s framework as well as on the limitations of his own model, 
which, in this case, is based on the notion of ‘‘reconstructive critique’’. 
Unfortunately, both aspects are missing, which makes  the  narrative  of 
this  study  at times appear unjustifiably  biased,  imbalanced, and  essen- 
tially steered towards making the author’s own argument work8. 
Fifth, when examining the various points made throughout the text, 
one will notice that there are several minor, yet noteworthy, incon- 
sistencies. (a) On the one hand, Boltanski’s account is described as less 
‘‘situationist’’ (p. 136) than ethnomethodological approaches in that it 
 
6  
See, for instance, pp. 28-33, 73-75, 136-140, 151-152, 156-156, 159-166, 187, and 249-252. 
7 
A few cursory comments on the weaknesses of Boltanski’s approach can be found, for 
instance, on pp.  153-157. 
8 
This  shortcoming  is  also  expressed  in  unsubstantiated  claims  such  as  the  following: 
‘‘Surely, one of the most controversial theses put forward by Bourdieu is the assumption that 
one’s own habitus cannot be converted into an object of reflection’’ (p. 68). Where does 
Bourdieu say so? Again, it is hardly surprising that no reference is provided given that, in fact, 
the opposite is true. 
  
insists upon the existence of ‘‘context-transcending normative struc- 
tures of everyday practices’’ (p. 136, italics added); on the other hand, it 
is characterized as having a profoundly ‘‘situationist focus’’ (p. 167), 
concerned with the concrete ‘‘contexts and conditions’’ (p. 167, italics 
added) in which ‘‘discursive regimes of justification’’ (p. 167) emerge in 
the first place. (b) Celikates may be right to assume that ‘‘actors, even 
under the most adverse social circumstances, are equipped with basic 
reflexive capacities and that, therefore, the curtailing or damaging of 
these capacities can only be partial and never lead  to  their complete 
loss’’ (p. 170); the problem, however, is that this remains an un- 
substantiated presupposition, that is, the author does not offer any 
analytical, let alone empirical, evidence to prove the validity of this 
assumption. (c) It may be true  that  the  distinction  between  internal 
and external critique is based on a ‘‘false alternative’’ (p. 187, italics 
added),  but Celikates does not provide any obvious reasons as to why  
we should not consider this to be a real, albeit counterproductive, 
alternative.  (d)  Although  the  late  Habermas  distances  himself,  for    
a  number  of  reasons,  from  his  early  account  of  the  alleged  nexus 
between knowledge and human interests, the whole point of  his  
assertion that ‘‘a radical critique of knowledge is possible only as social 
theory’’9   is   aimed   at   recognizing   that,   in   practice,   processes  of 
cognition and recognition are sociohistorically embedded, rather than 
‘‘abstract and ‘transhistorical’’’ (p. 191), as Celikates seems to suggest 
when examining Habermas’s concern with ‘‘quasi-transcendental con- 
ditions’’ (p. 191) in his universal and formal pragmatics10. One could 
add further examples to the list. 
Sixth, from a merely formalistic point of view, it may be worth 
mentioning that some of the (pertinent) quotations in the text appear 
excessively long and should at least be indented
11
, in order to separate the 
author’s own writing from the assertions made by other scholars.  
Furthermore, it would have been helpful if the book contained both  
an Index of Names and an Index of Subjects; given the richness of the 
 
 
9  
Jürgen  Habermas,  ‘‘Preface’’,  in  his  Knowledge  and  Human  Interests,  trans.  Jeremy  J. 
Shapiro (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987 [1968]), pp. vii-viii, here p. vii (italics added). 
10   
Some   Habermasian   scholars  may  disagree  with  Celikates’s ‘‘transcendentalist’’ interpre- 
tation of Habermas’s universal and formal pragmatics (see esp. p. 192) and may object that it is 
based on a misrepresentation of Habermas’s arguments. 
11 
Again, there are numerous examples to illustrate this point, but if this book is to be 
translated into English (or into any other language), the long quotations on the following pages 
should be indented: pp. 77, 84, 113-114, 115, 137, 162, 167, 186, 189, 205-206, 208, 215, 
221, 223, and 228. 
  
literature and arguments covered in this study, there is little doubt that 
the readers would have found such indices extremely useful. 
Finally, one may wonder to what extent Celikates’s project of 
‘‘reconstructive critique’’ remains trapped in a rationalist account of 
the social, which is concerned primarily with actors’ cognitive and 
linguistic capacities, rather than with their bodily constitution and 
non-rational ways of engaging with the world. Can there be a sociology 
of emancipation without a sociology of the body? The latter certainly 
escapes the agenda of merely rationalist approaches to individual and 
social emancipation. Whilst Celikates’s project of ‘‘reconstructive 
critique’’ is set out to take ordinary actors and their various self- 
empowering capacities seriously, it remains caught up in the tradition 
of mainstream theories of domination in conceiving of the subject’s 
rational and critical capacities as the motor of emancipatory social 
processes. Celikates’s book is a major contribution to the literature and 
makes a convincing case for regarding critical theory as a worthwhile 
project whose normative foundations are to be located in ordinary 
processes of action and reflection. If, however, we are willing to accept 
that emancipatory social practices are not limited to discursive pro- 
cesses of critique and justification, it must be the task of critical theory 
to break out of the rationalist straitjacket that prevents it from 
understanding that self-enlightenment is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for human emancipation. 
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